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This paper extends existing work on labor force participation dynamics by distinguishing 
between full-time and part-time employment and allowing unobserved heterogeneity in the 
effects of previous employment outcomes, children and education on employment dynamics. 
The results reveal significant autocorrelation in unobservables, and significant variation in the 
effects of children and education on labor supply preferences. Moreover, omission of random 
coeffcients or autocorrelation can bias significantly estimates of policy effects. On average, 
policies temporarily incentivizing part-time and full-time employment are equally effective 
tools for reducing non-employment. However, non-employment among women with young 
children is more responsive to policies encouraging part-time rather than full-time work. 
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Labor supply behavior measured at the individual level displays a great deal of persistence.1 Persis-
tence is observed both in participation decisions and in the hours of work of those in employment. In
other words, we observe persistence on the extensive margin and on the intensive margin. It is well
established, see for example Heckman (1981a) and Heckman (1981c), that persistence in labor supply
behavior can be generated by two di®erent mechanisms. On one hand, individual characteristics may
lead an individual to choose repeatedly the same employment state. Relevant characteristics consist of
observables, such as educational quali¯cations and household structure variables, and unobservables
including unobserved preferences and ability. Alternatively, persistence in labor supply behavior may
arise from state dependencies whereby an individual's previous labor supply behavior has a causal
e®ect on his or her current labor supply incentives. State dependencies may be generated by, for
example, changes in preferences or constraints caused by previous working behavior. For the purpose
of policy evaluation, it is critical to determine the relative contributions of state dependence and in-
dividual characteristics to the observed persistence in labor supply behavior. Indeed, if labor supply
choices are driven entirely by observed or unobserved individual characteristics then the e®ect of a
policy intervention, such as a wage subsidy or an in-work bene¯t, will cease the moment the policy is
withdrawn. In contrast, if past labor market outcomes exert a causal e®ect on current labor supply
behavior then the policy intervention will a®ect labor market outcomes beyond the duration of the
policy.
There exist several studies of labor force participation dynamics. Notably, Heckman (1981a)
studied the dynamics of women's labor force participation decisions, while controlling for persistent
unobserved individual characteristics. The results showed that unobserved individual characteristics
contribute signi¯cantly to the observed persistence in women's labor force participation behavior but
causal e®ects, or state dependencies, were also found to be present. A number of other studies report
similar results, see inter alia, Booth et al. (1999) and Heckman and Willis (1977). Keane (1993)
provided the ¯rst model of labor force participation with autocorrelated unobservables, while Hyslop
(1999) extended the literature further by allowing both autocorrelated unobservables and correlated
random e®ects, operationalized by including non-contemporaneous measures of observed individuals
characteristics, including measures of fertility at di®erent points in the life-cycle. Keane and Sauer ({)
in turn extend the work of Hyslop (1999) by including classi¯cation error in the dependent variable
along with an alternative treatment of the initial conditions. The inclusion of classi¯cation error was
found to change conclusions concerning the exogeneity of fertility in the labor supply equation. Specif-
ically, when classi¯cation error in labor force participation was included fertility became endogenous
in the labor supply equation.
This paper does not consider the implications of classi¯cation error or correlated random e®ects,
but instead provides two alternative extensions of existing studies of labor supply dynamics. First, this
paper analyzes the dynamics of individual labor supply in a multinomial choice framework, rather than
the more common binary choice setting. While the generalization to a multinomial model introduces
concerns pertaining to identi¯cation and furthers computational complexities, this extension provides
additional insight as it allows a study of the nature of intertemporal dependencies associated with
full-time and part-time employment. The results of this analysis are therefore informative about the
1Based on a sample of American women, Francesconi (2002) reports that 87.6% of women who were non-participants
last year are also non-participants this year. The corresponding ¯gures for full-time and part-time work are 87.6% and
68.9% respectively. Booth et al. (1999) report similar ¯gures for the United Kingdom.
2relative long-run e®ectiveness of labor market policies facilitating full-time and part-time employment.
This analysis would not be possible using a binary model of labor market participation, such as the
reduced form approach of Heckman (1981a) or the structural approach proposed by Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989).
The second generalization o®ered by this paper is to implement an econometric speci¯cation that
permits more general structures of unobservables than in previous studies of labor supply dynamics.
Speci¯cally, in additional to autocorrelated and time invariant unobservables, as used by Hyslop (1999)
in a binary setting, unobserved heterogeneity in the e®ects of previous employment outcomes, children
and educational quali¯cations on employment dynamics is included. This second extension is valuable
from and econometric perspective because it allows an exploration of the implications of di®erent
assumptions regarding the distribution of the unobservables for estimates of state dependencies and
the long-run e®ects of policy interventions in the context of a dynamic multinomial labor supply model.
Furthermore, determining the extent of any heterogeneity in the e®ects of demographic variables on
women's labor supply behavior is intrinsically important as it is informative about the extent to which
life-cycle labor supply behavior varies between women with identical observed characteristics. This is
particularly true when the characteristic in question is children; our analysis allows us to determine
whether the relatively high rates of non-employment observed among women with young children are
due to a common, or systematic, e®ect of young children on labor supply or whether young children
a®ect the labor supply behavior of some, but not all, women.
The central econometric framework is a dynamic mixed multinomial logit model including persis-
tent unobservables which are assumed to follow particular distributions and to occur independently
of observed individual characteristics, i.e., unobservables are assumed to be random e®ects.2 Param-
eter estimates are obtained using Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimation. We do not attempt to
estimate a ¯xed e®ects version of our model as bias-corrected ¯xed e®ects estimators applicable to
this dynamic, non-stationary, non-linear problem are not readily available. Moreover, unlike in a ¯xed
e®ects setting, within our random e®ects framework we can accommodate time-varying persistent
unobservables in the form of autocorrelation and random coe±cients on time-varying characteristics.
These features of the model speci¯cation are found to be empirically important. Moreover, we provide
evidence which supports the validity of the random e®ects assumptions.
In contrast to the binary case, for which identi¯cation is relatively straight forward, little is known
about the appropriates of assumptions concerning the distribution of the unobservables in our setting.
Indeed, previous work on multinomial choice models with complex speci¯cations of unobservables
in other areas of economics has shown that identi¯cation concerns sometimes arise in this setting.
Speci¯cally, Keane (1992) showed that identi¯cation of the parameters describing the distribution of
unobservables in cross-sectional multinomial choice models is often reliant on functional form restric-
tions. Harris and Keane (1998) explore this issue further and show that in a cross-sectional setting
alternative speci¯c covariates are required for robust identi¯cation.3
In the current setting employment state speci¯c covariates are not available; for example there
are no obvious variables that a®ect the utility from full-time employment but which do not enter
the utilities associated with part-time employment and non-employment. Thus, given only cross-
2Correlations between the persistent unobservables and the previous employment outcomes are naturally present in
this setting and are fully accounted for in the estimation. Note also that the inclusion of persistent unobservables breaks
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property which plagues the standard multinomial logit model.
3Indeed, the mixed multinomial logit model has been widely applied to problems in which there are alternative speci¯c
explanatory variables, for example in marketing, see Keane (1997).
3sectional data, a multinomial labor supply model with a °exible speci¯cation of unobservables would
be identi¯ed only by functional form restrictions. Similarly, in repeated multinomial choice models,
including the dynamic multinomial labor supply model under consideration, some of the more obvious,
fully parametric, speci¯cations of unobservables generate models which are identi¯ed purely by the
functional form of the distribution of unobserved individual characteristics. It is shown below that,
given repeated observations of individuals' choices, there are speci¯cations of unobservables for which
identi¯cation is not reliant on functional form restrictions. The empirical analysis below is conducted
using only speci¯cations of unobservables for which identi¯cation is not driven by functional form
restrictions.4 While some structures of unobserved heterogeneity are therefore ruled out, time invariant
individual speci¯c random e®ects, autocorrelated unobservables and random coe±cients are permitted.
Thus persistent unobservables may be time-varying with di®erent distributions depending on the
individual's observed characteristics and previous employment outcomes.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a fourteen year longitudinal sample taken from the
British Household Panel Survey. The unbalanced panel sample comprises of married and cohabiting
women and spans the years 1991-2005 inclusive. Three employment states are distinguished, namely
full-time work, part-time work and non-employment. For the sample of women under consideration
all three employment states are quantitatively important. Furthermore, there is a growing literature
documenting the relatively poor status of part-time jobs in the United Kingdom: Connolly and Gregory
(2008) and Manning and Petrongolo (2008) show that part-time jobs are typically poorly paid and are
concentrated menial occupations. Within the context of this literature it seems important to establish
whether part-time jobs are also associated with lower labor market attachment than full-time jobs.
We ¯nd signi¯cant autocorrelation in unobservables, and signi¯cant variation in the e®ects of chil-
dren and education on labor supply preferences. Our analysis shows that, irrespective of the assumed
distribution of the unobservables, signi¯cant positive own-state dependencies are present in both full-
time and part-time work. Equivalently, temporary policies incentivizing women to move into either
full-time or part-time work will a®ect women's employment behavior beyond the duration of the pol-
icy. This is in line with existing work on dynamic labor supply including Keane (1993) and Hyslop
(1999). Additionally, and in contrast to existing dynamic binary models of labor force participation,
our generalized model also allows us to exploit the multinomial structure to draw conclusions about
the relative e®ectiveness of temporary policies incentivizing jobs with di®erent hours of work. Consid-
ering the sample average, we ¯nd that policies incentivizing full-time employment are partly crowded
out by a reduction in part-time work, while polices that encourage part-time work have a positive
e®ect on the rate of full-time employment. These asymmetric cross-state e®ects mean that, although
own-state dependence is higher for full-time employment than for part-time employment, policies
temporarily incentivizing part-time and full-time employment are equally e®ective tools for reducing
non-employment. However, we ¯nd that for speci¯c subgroups, de¯ned by observed individual charac-
teristics, labor force participation is most e®ectively targeted by creating either full-time or part-time
jobs. For example, for women with young children, polices incentivizing part-time employment lead
to larger reductions in non-employment than policies incentivizing full-time employment.
Our results further show signi¯cant variation in preferences for full-time and part-time work,
relative to non-employment, among women with young children. We explore the implications of this
variation for employment dynamics following the birth of a child. We ¯nd that women with a high
4This restriction has the further advantage of generating models that are well behaved and means that parameters
can be estimated without encountering numerical problems.
4unobserved preference for full-time work when they have a young child are not more likely to be non-
employed following the birth of a child. Thus, the high rates of non-work among women with children
are due to changes in labor force participation behavior among a subset of women with children,
speci¯cally those women who have a low unobserved preference for full-time work in the event that
they have a young child.
A comparison of the results across the di®erent speci¯cations of unobservables reveals that esti-
mates of state dependencies are sensitive to the assumed distribution of the unobservables. As has
been frequently found in studies of labor force participation and unemployment, state dependencies are
overestimated if persistent unobservables are ignored. Less predictably, estimated state dependencies
tend to increase as the distribution of the unobservables is generalized from a speci¯cation allowing
time invariant random intercepts to more general speci¯cations allowing autocorrelated unobservables
and random coe±cients. We conclude that estimating dynamic labor supply models and ignoring
autocorrelation or variation in the e®ects of observed individual characteristics on labor supply be-
havior may bias signi¯cantly estimates of the long-term e®ectiveness of labor market policies. The
biases induced by ignoring autocorrelation or variation in the e®ects of observed individual charac-
teristic pertain predominantly to the long-run e®ects of policies that facilitate full-time, rather than
part-time, work.
The next section outlines a model describing an individual's choice between full-time employment,
part-time employment and non-employment. Section 3 introduces a dynamic mixed multinomial logit
model of labor supply behavior. Section 4 provides an overview of the British Household Panel
Survey, and summarizes the main features of the estimation sample. Section 5 contains the results,
including comparisons of policy e®ects based on di®erent assumptions concerning the distribution of
the unobservables. Section 6 concludes. Appendices I and II are devoted to Monte Carlo simulations
illustrating the performance of Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimators of the parameters of several
dynamic mixed multinomial logit models.
2 A Dynamic Multi-state Labor Supply Model
In year t individual i chooses between full-time employment (f), part-time employment (p) and non-
employment (n) so as to maximize her current payo®.5;6 The individual receives a payo® V j(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t)
if she chooses employment state j at time t for j = f;p;n. Payo®s are functions of the relevant ele-
ments of the individual's employment history, ­i;t¡1, individual characteristics observed by both the
individual and the econometrician, denoted Xi;t and henceforth referred to as explanatory variables,
and individual characteristics that are known to the individual but which are unobserved to the econo-
metrician, denoted %i;j;t for j = f;p;n. The variables ­i;t¡1, Xi;t and %i;j;t may be vectors. Conditional
on observed characteristics and the individual's employment history, optimizing behavior on the part
5Discrete choice labor supply models have three advantages over continuous or mixed discrete-continuous models of
labor supply. First, a discrete opportunity set re°ects that many individuals face a choice between a small number of
wage-hours contracts, and consequently are unable to vary their hours of work continuously. Second, the grouping of
reported hours into a small number of categories tends to reduce measurement error. Last, discrete approaches generate
empirically tractable labor supply functions consistent with non-linearities or discontinuities in budget set generated by
¯xed costs of employment or the structure of the tax and bene¯t system (see van Soest, 1995).
6The term \payo®" in this context is taken to refer to the individual's utility associated with a particular employment
state, taking into account any costs and bene¯ts, as well as the income, associated with the employment state.
5of the individual implies the following labor supply probabilities
Pi;f;t(­i;t¡1;Xi;t) = P
Ã
V f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t) ¸ V p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t)





V p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t) > V f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t)





V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) > V f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t)
­i;t¡1;Xi;t V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) > V p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t)
!
; (1c)
where Pi;j;t(­i;t¡1;Xi;t) is the probability of individual i choosing employment state j at time t and
P() denotes a probability.
The above formulation is su±ciently general so as to allow dependencies between an individual's
past and current labor supply decisions due to habit formation in labor supply behavior (Bover,
1991; Kubin and Prinz, 2002; Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998), wage based rewards for human capital
accumulated via labor market experience (Altug and Miller, 1998; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Imai
and Keane, 2004; Wolpin, 1992) and job search costs (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Hyslop, 1999).
Habit formation gives rise to non-separabilities in the utility function, while accumulation of human
capital and job search costs imply non-separabilities in the budget constraint. All three mechanisms
create dependencies between past and current labor supply choices. Speci¯cally, job search costs
generate dependencies between labor supply choices in consecutive years, while habit formation and
the accumulation of human capital have the potential to create dependencies in labor supply behavior
spanning several years.
In all that follows reduced form, rather than structural, approaches to estimating the parameters
of the above model are adopted. Reduced form approaches are adequate because, in this study, the
quantities of interest are the nature of any intertemporal dependencies in labor supply behavior rather
than the underlying structural parameters. Moreover, taking a reduced form perspective avoids having
the solve the dynamic programming model implicit in the above, leading to computationally simpler
models within which it is feasible to accommodate relatively general distributions of unobservables.
3 Estimation Strategy
Dynamic mixed multinomial logit models are obtained by adopting a speci¯cation for the payo®
functions appearing in the above labor supply probabilities and then placing appropriate distributional
assumptions on the unobserved individual characteristics. The speci¯cation of the payo®s may be
interpreted as an approximation to the state speci¯c value functions occurring in the underlying
dynamic programming problem (see, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Francesconi, 2002). In
this case, preference parameters are compounded with parameters appearing in the budget constraint.
This section proceeds by discussing the speci¯cation of payo®s, the treatment of the initial conditions,
and issues surrounding identi¯cation. Finally, the chosen empirical speci¯cation is presented together
with the proposed Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
3.1 Speci¯cation of Payo®s
An examination of Equations (1a)-(1c) reveals that labor supply probabilities can be expressed in
terms of the two indices V f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t) ¡ V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) and V p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t) ¡
6V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t).7 The following speci¯cation is adopted
V j(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t) ¡ V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) =
­i;t¡1°j + Xi;tbj + hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t) for j = f;p; (2)
where bj and °j for j = f;p are suitably dimensioned vectors of unknown parameters and hj()
for j = f;p are functions describing the unobserved components of the individual's payo®s.8 The
unobserved individual characteristics %i;j;t for j = f;p are assumed to occur independently of the
individual's observed characteristics Xi;s for all s and t, and thus are individual speci¯c random
e®ects. In Section 5.5 we present evidence supporting the robustness of our results to the random
e®ects assumption. The coe±cient vectors bf and bp measure the deterministic e®ect of the individual
characteristics in Xi;t, such as education and household structure variables, on an individual's payo®s
from, respectively, full-time work and part-time work relative to her payo® from non-employment.
The explanatory variables Xi;t do not include employment state speci¯c variables, such as wages or
incomes, because such quantities are unobserved for all employment states not chosen by the individual
at time t.
The coe±cient vectors °f and °p measure the deterministic e®ect of the individual's employ-
ment history on, respectively, her payo® from full-time employment relative to her payo® from non-
employment and on her payo® from part-time employment relative to her payo® from non-employment.
State dependencies are present if any elements of °f or °p are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The
econometric analysis is conducted using panel data where information about an individual's employ-
ment history is restricted to the duration of the individual's presence in the panel. Thus, prior to
estimation, restrictions on the speci¯cation of ­i;t¡1 are required. In this study attention is restricted
to the case where only the individual's labor market outcomes in the past two years a®ect her payo®s
in the current year. Speci¯cally ­i;t¡1 = [Yi;f;t¡1;Yi;p;t¡1;Yi;f;t¡2;Yi;p;t¡2], where Yi;j;t is an indicator
taking the value one if individual i was in employment state j at time t and zero otherwise. Suppose
labor market outcomes are observed in years t = 1;:::;T. Equation (2) then holds for t = 3;:::;T.
This speci¯cation should not be overly restrictive as the strongest intertemporal dependencies in labor
supply incentives are likely to occur over short time horizons. Further support for this speci¯cation
of the relevant employment history is provided in Section 5.5.
3.2 The Initial Conditions Problem
An initial conditions problem arises when estimating this model. Given the dynamic structure of
the model and the above described speci¯cation of the individual's employment history, ­i;t¡1, the
individual's employment outcome in the year t = 1 depends on her employment outcomes in the years
t = 0 and t = ¡1, which are unobserved to the econometrician. Likewise, the individual's employment
outcome in the year t = 2 depends on her unobserved employment outcome in the year t = 0.
Therefore, employment outcomes in the years t = 1 and t = 2, referred to as the initial conditions,
cannot be modeled in the same way as subsequent employment outcomes. When estimating the
parameters of the above model, the treatment of the initial conditions proposed by Wooldridge (2005)
7The third index V
f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t) ¡ V
p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t) is redundant as it is equal to the di®erence between
the other two indices.
8Without loss of generality, the unobserved characteristics %i;j;t for j = f;p are henceforth taken to represent unob-
served characteristics that a®ect that the di®erence between the individual's payo® from employment state j and her
payo® from non-employment.
7is adopted. According to this approach, individual likelihood contributions are de¯ned as the joint
probability of an individual's observed employment outcomes at t = 3;:::;T conditional on explanatory
variables and initial conditions.9
Implementation of the approach of Wooldridge (2005) requires the functions hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t)
for j = f;p appearing in Equation (2) be modi¯ed to include the individual's employment outcomes
in the years t = 1 and t = 2, denoted by ICi. In all that follows, ICi consists of ¯ve variables
indicating if the woman worked full-time, worked part-time or was non-employed in both t = 1 and
t = 2, worked both full-time and part-time in her ¯rst two years in the sample or worked full-time
and was non-employed in her ¯rst two years in the sample. The modi¯ed functions describing the
unobservables are denoted e hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) for j = f;p. For t = 3;:::;T, the unobserved
individual characteristics %i;j;t for j = f;p are assumed to occur independently of ICi and fXi;sgT
s=3.
The following de¯nitions are required prior to deriving individual i's contribution to the likelihood.
De¯ne %i;j as %i;j;t stacked over t = 3;:::;T for j = f;p and let G(%i;f;%i;p) denote the distribution of
(%i;f;%i;p). De¯ne the one by three dimensional vectors Af = (1;0;0), Ap = (0;1;0) and An = (0;0;1)
and let Ai;t = Aj if individual i chose state j at time t for j = f;p;n. Additionally de¯ne the two by







n)0 if Yi;f;t = 1
(A0
f;A0
n)0 if Yi;p;t = 1 for t = 3;:::;T:
(A0
f;A0
p)0 if Yi;n;t = 1
(3)
Lastly, let Vi;t denote V j(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t) stacked vertically over j = f;p;n. Individual i's contribu-




I(Ai;3Vi;3 ¸ maxfBi;3Vi;3g \ Ai;4Vi;4 ¸ maxfBi;4Vi;4g \ :::






I(Ai;tVi;t ¸ maxfBi;tVi;tg)dG(%i;f;%i;p); (4b)
where I(:) is an indicator of whether the statement in parenthesis is true and the integral in the above
equations is over the entire support of (%i;f;%i;p).
3.3 Identi¯cation and the Distribution of Unobservables
Identi¯cation of multinomial choice models requires well-known scale and location normalizations (see
Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Bunch, 1991; Keane, 1992). By specifying the problem in terms of
9In contrast, Heckman (1981b) suggests modeling the joint distribution of an individual's employment outcomes over
the entire sample period. This requires a speci¯cation of the joint distribution of the individual's employment outcomes
in the years t = 1 and t = 2 and a speci¯cation of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. In general, the exact
distribution of the initial conditional is impossible to derive. (In the absence of non-stationary explanatory variables
it is possible to derive the equilibrium distribution of the process which can then be used as the distribution of the
initial conditions. However the presence of a number of non-stationary explanatory variables, including age and the time
dummies, in the current application renders using an exact speci¯cation of the initial conditions impossible.) Instead,
Heckman (1981b) suggests approximating the distribution of the initial observations conditional exogenous explanatory
variables. The Wooldridge approach does not require a model of the joint distribution of the individual's employment
outcomes in the years t = 1 and t = 2 or a speci¯cation of the joint distribution of unobservables occurring at t = 1 and
t = 2 and the unobservables occurring in future years. This has the computational advantage, relative to the Heckman
(1981b) approach, of reducing the number of unknown parameters.
8di®erences in payo®s the required location normalizations have been imposed. However, depending
on the distribution of the unobservables, an identifying scale normalization might be required as
multiplying all payo®s, including the components of payo®s attributable to unobservables, by a positive
constant does not change the individual's behavior. In all that follows G(%i;f;%i;p) is taken to be the
distribution of the unobserved individual characteristics after the minimum normalizations required
to ensure identi¯cation have been imposed.
The functions e hj() for j = f;p and the distribution function G(%i;f;%i;p) dictate both the structure
of persistence in unobservables and the joint distribution of unobservables occurring in a particular
year. As discussed above, allowing persistence in unobservables is necessary for determining correctly
the nature of state dependencies in labor supply behavior. Meanwhile, Hausman and Wise (1978) show
that estimates of marginal e®ects, substitution patterns and elasticities are not robust to the assumed
intratemporal distribution of the unobservables. It is therefore desirable to work with a °exible
distribution of unobservables. However, even after imposing all necessary identifying scale and location
normalizations, care is required when working with °exible forms of the above described structure of
the unobservables. Indeed, unlike in the binary case, in the current multinomial labor supply model
some of the more obvious, fully parametric, speci¯cations of e hj() for j = f;p and distribution of
the unobserved individual characteristics, G(%i;f;%i;p), generate models which are identi¯ed purely by
the functional form of the distribution of the unobserved individual characteristics and therefore are
nonparametrically unidenti¯ed.
The possibility of an absence of nonparametric identi¯cation can be understood by manipulating
the individual likelihood contributions displayed above in Equation (4b). For given choices of e hj() for
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i;p) for t = 3;:::;T is the collection of all unobserved individual
characteristics that a®ect payo®s at time t and occur independently of the unobserved individual char-
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In a nonparametric setting each of the distribution functions Gt(%t
i;f;%t
i;p) for t = 3;:::;T can be varied
independently of Ga(%a
i;f;%a
i;p). In other words there are unknown parameters that can a®ect the con-
ditional probability that Ai;tVi;t ¸ maxfBi;tVi;tg but which do not enter Ga(%a
i;f;%a
i;p). In this case the
bivariate distribution functions, which appear in parenthesis in Equation (5), are nonparametrically
unidenti¯ed as the same variables a®ect both the probability that Ai;tVi;t > Bi;t;1Vi;t and the proba-
bility that Ai;tVi;t > Bi;t;2Vi;t, where Bi;t;k for k = 1;2 denotes the kth row of Bi;t.10;11 Consequently,
parametric distributions of unobservables that do not impose any structure, beyond their functional
10Equation (5) further shows that the lack of nonparametric identi¯cation is related to the absence of employment
state speci¯c explanatory variables. If, in contrast to the speci¯cation given in Equation (2), the payo®s included, for
example, employment state speci¯c incomes or other characteristics of the employment states, parameters would, under
appropriate regularity conditions, be nonparametrically identi¯ed (see Harris and Keane, 1998; Keane, 1992).
11The lack of nonparametric identi¯cation is speci¯c to discrete choice models with three or more alternatives; in the
corresponding binary model nonparametric identi¯cation is less problematic as choice probabilities depend on a single
index.
9form, on G(%i;f;%i;p) generate dynamic mixed multinomial choice models that are nonparametrically
unidenti¯ed.
Keane (1992) presents Monte Carlo evidence illustrating the very poor empirical performance of
cross-sectional multinomial choice models which are identi¯ed only by the functional form of the dis-
tribution of the unobservables. Speci¯cally, Keane (1992) showed that the cross-sectional multinomial
probit model with heteroscedastic and correlated unobservables su®ers from possible non-convergence,
highly biased parameter estimates and a close to singular Hessian which translates into huge stan-
dard errors. These problems arise because it is possible to adjust the intercepts and coe±cients on
explanatory variables so as to o®set almost completely the e®ect on choice probabilities of changes
in the parameters describing the distribution of the unobservables, namely variance and correlation
parameters. Consequently, the criterion function, a likelihood in Keane's study, is almost completely
°at over a large subset of the parameter space. Further Monte Carlo simulations, discussed below
in Appendix I, illustrate the severity of the numerical problems a²icting a dynamic mixed multino-
mial logit model in which identi¯cation is reliant on the functional form of the distribution of the
unobservables.
Given these problems, in this study attention is restricted to model speci¯cations in which the
distribution of unobservables is nonparametrically identi¯ed. This entails three requirements. Firstly,
as illustrated above, the structure of the unobservables must be restricted such that Gt(%t
i;f;%t
i;p) for
t = 3;:::;T cannot be varied independently of Ga(%a
i;f;%a
i;p). Secondly, the probability of a transition
between each pair of employment states must be strictly positive for each value of (Xi;t;ICi). Indeed,
with no change in employment status between t = 3 and t = T repeated observations provide no
additional identifying information concerning the distribution of the unobservables. Finally, Xi;t for
t = 3;:::;T must contains one variable that is continuously distributed over individuals and bf and
bp must be such that both coe±cients on this variable are non-zero. A continuously distributed
variable is required because conditional on (fXi;sgT
s=3;ICi) identi¯cation is limited by the number of
di®erent combinations of transitions between employment states. Variation in Xi;t across individuals
creates variation in the probability associated with each possible combination of transitions between
employment states. Additional Monte Carlo simulations reported in Appendix I show that reliable
estimates of the parameters of a dynamic mixed multinomial logit model are obtained when the model
speci¯cation satis¯es these requirements.
3.4 Empirical Speci¯cation
The adopted speci¯cation of the unobservables allows time invariant individual speci¯c random e®ects,
autocorrelated unobservables and time invariant random coe±cients. Mathematically, e hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi)
for j = f;p take the following form
e hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) =
­i;t¡1!i;j + Wi;t¼i;j + ICi(#j + Ãi;j) + ³i;j;t + ºi;j + »i;f;t for j = f;p;t = 3;:::;T; (6a)
where Wi;t denotes selected elements of Xi;t, and ³i;f;t and ³i;p;t follow ¯rst order autoregressive pro-
cesses
³i;j;t = ½j³i;j;t¡1 + &i;j;t for j = f;p;t = 3;:::;T: (6b)
In the above (f»i;j;t;&i;j;tgT
t=3;!i;j;¼i;j;Ãi;j;ºi;j;³i;j;2) for j = f;p are unobserved individual character-
istics and #j for j = f;p and suitably dimensioned vectors of unknown parameters.
10The pairs (»i;f;t;»i;p;t) for t = 3;:::;T are assumed to occur independently over time and thus repre-
sent time-varying shocks to individuals' payo®s. In accordance with the above described requirements
for nonparametric identi¯cation, the pairs (»i;f;t;»i;p;t) for t = 3;:::;T are assumed to have distributions
that do not contain unknown parameters. In what follows, »i;f;t and »i;p;t are de¯ned respectively as
²i;f;t ¡ ²i;n;t and ²i;p;t ¡ ²i;n;t for t = 3;:::;T where ²i;j;t for j = f;p;n and are mutually independent
and independent of fXi;sgT
s=3 and ICi. Furthermore ²i;j;t for j = f;p;n are assumed to have type I
extreme value distributions.12
The remaining unobserved individual characteristics, denoted (%i;f;t;%i;p;t), therefore consist of four
distinct components: (i) !i;f and !i;p are the random components of the coe±cients on the individ-
ual's employment history; (ii) ¼i;f and ¼i;p represent the random components of the coe±cients on
the explanatory variables, Wi;t; (iii) Ãi;f and Ãi;p are the random components of the coe±cients on
the initial conditions; (iv) ³i;f;t and ³i;p;t represent the autocorrelated random components of the em-
ployment state speci¯c intercepts while ºi;f and ºi;p are time invariant random components of the
employment state speci¯c intercepts. The random coe±cients allow di®erent amounts of unobserved
variation in payo®s, depending on the individual's observed characteristics, initial employment state
and previous working behavior, while the random components of the employment state speci¯c in-
tercepts capture persistent unobserved di®erences between individuals that occur irrespective of the
observed characteristic and previous employment behavior.
Let hi;j;t = hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) denote e hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) net of »i;j;t. It follows that,
conditional on (­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t;%i;p;t;ICi), the individual's choice probabilities are independent over
time and take the familiar multinomial logit form
Pi;j;t(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t;%i;p;t;ICi) =
exp(­i;t¡1°j + Xi;tbj + hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi))
1 +
P
k=f;p exp(­i;t¡1°k + Xi;tbk + hk(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;k;t;ICi))





k=f;p exp(­i;t¡1°k + Xi;tbk + hk(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;k;t;ICi))
for t = 3;:::;T: (7b)
Let (%i;f;%i;p) denote (%i;f;t;%i;p;t) stacked over t = 3;:::;T and let F(%i;f;%i;p) denote the distribution









As described above in Section 3.3 nonparametric identi¯cation of F(%i;f;%i;p) requires a variable in
Xi;t that is continuously distributed across individuals. In this application non-labor income ful¯lls
this role. It follows that if hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) allows only time invariant individual speci¯c
random e®ects, and therefore excludes random coe±cients and autocorrelation, then F(%i;f;%i;p) is
nonparametrically identi¯ed if T ¸ 4. If hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) additionally allows autocorrelation
in the employment state speci¯c intercepts then T ¸ 5 is required in order for F(%i;f;%i;p) to be
nonparametrically identi¯ed. In this case, an extra year of observations is required in order to separate
the autocorrelated and time invariant unobservables. The introduction of random coe±cients does
not require a longer panel for nonparametric identi¯cation provided that random coe±cients on the
time dummies and any other variables that, for all individuals, are non-zero in a maximum of one
12Assuming a type I extreme value distribution implies P(²i;j;t · q) = exp(¡exp(¡q)).
11year between t = 3 and T are excluded. This ensures that all random coe±cients with a distribution
containing unknown parameters a®ect payo®s in at least two years between t = 3 and t = T.
Six di®erent speci¯cations of the unobservables are considered. The ¯rst speci¯cation, presented
primarily for comparative purposes, consists of a standard multinomial logit model. The second and
third speci¯cations allow the employment state speci¯c intercepts to include time invariant individual
e®ects. In the second speci¯cation these are jointly normally distributed with mean zero and an unre-
stricted covariance matrix while the third speci¯cation assumes a distribution generated by a mixture
of two normal distributions with di®erent means and covariance matrices. The fourth speci¯cation
allows the employment state speci¯c intercepts to contain time invariant components, assumed to
be jointly normally distributed, and autocorrelated components, where the autocorrelation processes
are jointly normal and the initial conditions of the autocorrelation processes ensure stationary. The
¯fth speci¯cation allows time invariant individual e®ects, assumed to be jointly normally distributed,
and random coe±cients on the individual's previous employment outcomes, the initial conditions and
selected explanatory variables. The two random coe±cients on a particular variable, for example the
kth elements of ¼i;f and ¼i;p, are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero mean and an
unrestricted covariance matrix, and all pairs of random coe±cients are mutually independent and
independent of the random components of the employment state speci¯c intercepts.13 The sixth spec-
i¯cation is the most general speci¯cation under consideration and additionally allows autocorrelation,
as previously described, in the employment state speci¯c intercepts.
3.5 Estimation Methodology and Performance
Given a sample of N individuals and assuming independence over individuals, the likelihood function
is the product of the individual likelihood contributions for the sample members, given above in Equa-
tion (8). However, due to the integration with respect to the unobserved individual characteristics,
analytic expressions for the individual likelihood contributions are unavailable for all but the simplest
speci¯cations of unobserved heterogeneity. Let ¨i denote the 2(T ¡ 2) by 2(T ¡ 2) covariance matrix
of the unobservables hj(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;j;t;ICi) stacked over j = f;p and then over t = 3;:::;T. The di-
mension of the integral occurring in the individual's likelihood contribution is equal to the rank of ¨i,
which in turn depends on the assumed distribution of the unobservables. Speci¯cations in which un-
observables take the form of time invariant random intercepts require integration over two dimensions
while each pair of random coe±cients adds two to the dimension of the integral, up to a maximum
of 2(T ¡ 2). Speci¯cations that include autocorrelation involve 2(T ¡ 2) dimensional integrals. For
two dimensional problems fast and accurate quadrature methods are available to evaluate the indi-
vidual likelihood contributions (Geweke, 1996, provides a survey). However numerical methods are
unable to evaluate the likelihood contributions with su±cient speed and accuracy to be e®ective in
problems where the dimension of integration is greater than two (see Bhat, 2001; Hajivassiliou and
Rudd, 1994). Consequently, numerical methods to evaluate the likelihood contributions are unavail-
able when unobservables feature random coe±cients on several variables or when T is moderately
large and unobservables are autocorrelated.
For models where an analytic expression for the likelihood is unavailable we use simulation tech-
niques to evaluate the likelihood contributions. Simulation methods replace the intractable integral
in the likelihood function by a sum over likelihood functions evaluated at di®erent draws from the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Let (%r
i;f;%r
i;p) denote the rth draw from the distribution
13Allowing correlations between all pairs of random coe±cients leads to a prohibitively large number of parameters.














Continuing to assume independence over individuals, the simulated likelihood is the product of the
simulated individual likelihood contributions for the sample members. Maximum Simulated Likelihood
estimates are obtained by maximizing the log simulated likelihood function. By the strong law of large
numbers the Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimates converge almost surely to the true parameters
as R ! 1 and N ! 1. Moreover, if R increases at a fast enough rate relative to N, Maximum
Simulated Likelihood estimation is asymptotically equivalent to Maximum Likelihood estimation. In
particular, with pseudo random draws,
p
N=R ! 0 as N ! 1 is required (Hajivassiliou and Rudd,
1994).
In this application, the likelihood is simulated using antithetic variates rather than pseudo random
draws. Antithetic variates are a variance reduction technique which reduces simulation noise by
using draws from the distribution of the unobservables with more even coverage than pseudo random
draws. R antithetic draws are obtained by taking R=2 pseudo random draws from the distribution




r=1. Assuming F(%i;f;%i;p) is symmetric around zero, the remaining




r=1. Hajivassiliou (1999) presents Monte Carlo evidence which
shows that the use of antithetic variates in Maximum Simulated Likelihood problems approximately
halves the number of draws required to obtain a given level of accuracy.
Appendix II presents Monte Carlo evidence demonstrating the empirical properties of the Max-
imum Simulated Likelihood estimator of the parameters of the two most complex speci¯cations of
unobservables under consideration. In summary, for a speci¯cation in which unobservables include
random coe±cients but exclude autocorrelated unobservables evaluation of the likelihood using 500
antithetic draws yields parameter estimates with tolerably small amounts of bias. A speci¯cation
including autocorrelation displays a moderate amount of simulation bias when 500 or 2000 antithetic
draws are used, but biases are relatively small when estimation uses 5000 antithetic draws. Therefore
all of the empirical analysis conducted in this paper uses 5000 antithetic draws.
4 Data and Sample
The data source used for the empirical analysis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The
BHPS is an ongoing annual panel survey that started in 1991 with a nationally representative sample
of approximately 5,500 households in Great Britain. The sample used for analysis is an unbalanced
panel covering the fourteen years 1991-2004. The last year of data for each individual is used purely to
construct variables measuring fertility expectations and therefore a maximum of thirteen observations
of a woman's employment behavior are available. Attention is restricted to married or cohabiting, non-
retired women aged between 18 and 65 years and hence single mothers and single adult households are
excluded from the sample. Women enter that sample in the ¯rst year in which they responded to the
BHPS and satis¯ed the sample criteria. A woman remains in the sample unless she failed to respond
to the BHPS, ceased to be married or cohabiting, retired or reached age 65 years. Furthermore, only
women who provided at least four consecutive years of data are included in the sample. The ¯nal
sample consists of 4,663 di®erent women.
Table 1 shows number of women joining the sample in each year and the distribution of durations
in the sample for each cohort of entrants. Fewer than half of the sampled women entered at the start
13of the BHPS in 1991; entry was observed every year with substantial additional numbers of women
entering in 1997, 1999 and 2001, when additional samples were added to the BHPS. While there is a
high level of attrition, a large number of women remained in the sample for ¯ve or more years and
over eight hundred women were present in all fourteen years.14
First Year Number of Years in the Sample
Total
in Sample 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1991 202 126 109 106 101 90 107 87 92 67 808 1895
1992 14 18 11 10 8 12 6 7 15 54 - 155
1993 14 11 7 13 3 3 6 5 64 - - 126
1994 17 11 6 8 5 3 6 48 - - - 104
1995 9 10 6 9 3 4 60 - - - - 101
1996 10 9 14 6 5 59 - - - - - 103
1997 37 227 13 8 56 - - - - - - 341
1998 34 7 6 72 - - - - - - - 119
1999 94 75 675 - - - - - - - - 844
2000 42 160 - - - - - - - - - 202
2001 673 - - - - - - - - - - 673
Any 1146 654 847 232 181 171 185 147 171 121 808 4663
Table 1: The number of women entering the sample in each year 1991-2001 and the distribution of
durations in the sample for each cohort of entrants.
The measure of employment status is based on reported usual weekly hours of work. Figure 1(a)
shows the density of the observed usual hours of work of the sampled women in employment, that
is those with strictly positive usual hours of work. There are pronounced peaks at around 20 and
38 hours of work per week representing the hours of work frequently associated with, respectively,
full-time and part-time work. For the purpose of the empirical analysis, and in accordance with the
conventional British de¯nitions of full-time and part-time work, women reporting usual weekly hours
of work of between zero and 30 hours are classi¯ed as part-time employed, and women reporting
usual weekly hours of work of over 30 hours are classi¯ed as full-time employed. Non-employment
corresponds to zero usual weekly hours of work.15 Classi¯cation error in employment status should
be minimal as observations of usual hours of work refer to usual working hours at the exact time of
the annual survey, rather than being a retrospective report of usual working hours at some pervious
date. The top panel of Table 2 shows the percentage of women observed in each employment state in
each of the years 1991-2003. On average, approximately a quarter of women were non-employed, 30%
were working part-time and 45% were working full-time. There were no pronounced changes over the
sample period in the proportions of women in each employment state.
Figures 1(b)- 1(d) illustrate the high level of persistence in women's employment outcomes. Around
85% of women who were working full-time one year previously are in full-time employment this year.
Similarly, approximately 80% of women who were working part-time or who were non-employed one
year previously are in the same employment state this year. There is also evidence of persistence
over a longer time horizon. For example, around 55% of women who were working full-time 12 years
previously are currently in full-time work. The corresponding ¯gures for part-time work and non-
employment are 50% and 39% respectively.
14Due to attrition the women in this sample will not be representative of the corresponding population. However this
sample can be used to estimate parameters of interest provided that, conditional on observed characteristics, attrition is
unrelated to employment status or, in other words, if there is no selectivity problem.
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(c) Labor market outcomes of women who were working




















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Years after reference date
Full−time Part−time Non−emp.
(d) Labor market outcomes of women who were non-
employed t years previously.
Notes: The sample used to construct Figure 1(a) has been truncated at 60 hours per week which excludes 0.5% of the
observations.
Figure 1: Density of observed hours and observed persistence in employment outcomes.
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis are the conventional variables used in
studies of women's labor supply behavior: education; age; child related variables; and non-labor
income. Additionally, measures of short-term fertility expectations are constructed in order to capture
any adjustments in women's labor supply behavior shortly before the arrival of a child. The bottom
panel of Table 2 reports the sample means of the explanatory variables and further details concerning
the de¯nition of these variables are given in the accompanying notes.
5 Results
The dynamic mixed multinomial logit model is estimated with six di®erent speci¯cations of unobserved
individual characteristics, as described above in Section 3.4. The parameter estimates and average
marginal e®ects obtained from Speci¯cation VI are discussed in Section 5.1. In sections 5.2 and 5.3 we
explore respectively the long-term labor supply e®ects of job creation policies and the extent of any
heterogeneity in labor supply dynamics following the birth of a child, again based on Speci¯cation VI.
In Section 5.4 we investigate the importance of allowing autocorrelation and random coe±cients by
making comparisons with the results obtained from Speci¯cations I-V, which impose more restrictive
distributions of unobservables.
165.1 Parameter Estimates and Average Marginal E®ects
Speci¯cation VI is the most general speci¯cation under consideration. This speci¯cation allows ran-
dom intercepts with both time invariant and autocorrelated components, and time invariant random
coe±cients on the indicators of having a degree and the woman's youngest child being aged under one
year. Time invariant random coe±cients on previous employment outcomes and the initial conditions
are also included. Experimentation with various speci¯cations of the random coe±cients revealed
that there are no random coe±cients with signi¯cant amounts of variation on any other explanatory
variables.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the deterministic components of the coe±cients on the
previous employment outcomes and explanatory variables. The coe±cient estimates are as expected
and are not discussed. Instead we focus on Table 5 which shows how the coe±cients translate into
average marginal e®ects. The results for Speci¯cation VI show that any increase in quali¯cations from
no quali¯cations signi¯cantly increases the probability full-time work, but has no signi¯cant e®ect the
probability of working part-time. There is a small but signi¯cant negative income e®ect for full-time
work. In contrast, changes in non-labor income do not signi¯cantly a®ect the probability of part-time
work. Young children have a very strong negative e®ect on working full-time. Speci¯cally, women
whose youngest child is aged one year or under are, on average, 33.87(1.82) percentage points less
likely to be working full-time than otherwise identical women without children. The e®ect of children
on a woman's probability of engaging in full-time work decreases quickly as the age of the woman's
youngest child increases. Indeed, a woman whose youngest child is aged between 12 and 16 years
has the same probability of working full-time as an otherwise identical woman without children. A
youngest child aged between 1 and 7 years has a large positive e®ect the probability of working part-
time. Expecting a child in 4-6 months time signi¯cantly decreases the probability of full-time work
while, ceteris paribus, women who are expecting a child in the next three month have a signi¯cantly
lower probability of working full-time or part-time than women who are not expecting a child.
The results for Speci¯cation VI in Table 5 further show that, on average over the sampled women,
working full-time rather than being non-employed in the previous year increases the probability of
working full-time in the current year by 44.24(2.43) percentage points. Similarly, working part-time
rather than being non-employed increases the probability of working part-time in the current year
by 24.62(2.41) percentage points. These results con¯rm the presence of signi¯cant state dependence
on women's labor supply behavior. Intertemporal dependencies are explored in more detail below in
Section 5.2.
In terms of the distribution of the unobservables, the results in Table 4 pertaining to Speci¯ca-
tion VI reveal negative ¯rst order autocorrelation in the unobservables a®ecting payo®s from full-
time employment and positive ¯rst order autocorrelation in the unobservables a®ecting payo®s from
part-time employment.16 Women with young children have very large amounts of variation in their
unobserved payo®s from working full-time. There is also signi¯cant variation in women's unobserved
preferences for part-time employment if they have a young child, but far less than for full-time employ-
ment. This variation in payo®s might re°ect unobserved variation in child-care costs or productivity
in home production. Similarly, women with a degree level quali¯cation have a signi¯cantly higher
level of unobserved variation in their payo®s from working full-time than women with other levels
of quali¯cations. This is consistent with a relatively high level of heterogeneity in the labor market
16A likelihood ratio test for the joint signi¯cance of ½f and ½p reveals that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Speci¯cation I has no unknown parameters in the distribution of the unobservables.
In Speci¯cations II and IV-VI, §Intercept 1 is the covariance matrix of the time invariant components of the random
intercepts. Speci¯cation III has time invariant random intercepts with a distribution obtained from the mixture of two
bivariate normal distributions: with probability ® the random intercepts have mean zero and variance §Intercept 1
and with probability (1 ¡ ®) the random intercepts have mean ¹2 and variance §Intercept 2. In speci¯cations allowing
autocorrelation in the random intercepts, ½f and ½p are the ¯rst order autocorrelation coe±cients and §³ is the covariance
matrix of the innovations in the autoregressive processes. §DEGREE and §CHILD are the covariance matrices of the
random coe±cients on the indicated variables. The covariance matrices of the random coe±cients on the initial conditions
in Speci¯cations V and VI are not reported.
Table 4: Estimates of parameters appearing in the distribution of unobservables for Speci¯cations II-VI
of the dynamic mixed multinomial logit model.
returns to a university education. The coe±cients on lagged employment behavior display relatively
small and generally insigni¯cant amounts of variation. In contrast, the random coe±cients on the
initial conditions, not reported, display signi¯cant variation indicating di®erences in the distribution
of unobserved individual characteristics according the individual's initial employment status.
5.2 Employment Dynamic following Job Creation Policies
In this section we explore the short and long-run e®ectiveness of labor market policies that temporarily








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20policies" is such that they cause women who chose non-employment in both their ¯rst and second
years in the sample to move into, depending on the policy, either full-time or part-time work. The
interventions themselves last only one year and therefore employment outcomes subsequent to the
policies are a®ected only via the e®ect of the individual's previous employment outcome on her current
payo®s. We look ¯rst at the e®ect of these policies averaged over the sample and then explore how
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(f) Non-employed women moved into part-time work -
Young child.
Notes: Vertical bars represent 95% con¯dence intervals.
Figure 2: Simulated employment e®ects of policy interventions based on Speci¯cation VI.
21Figure 2(a) shows the average long-run e®ect on employment behavior of a temporary policy
causing non-employed individuals to move into full-time work. We see that this policy causes a
signi¯cant increase in full-time work of 30.5 percentage points in the year immediately after the policy
is removed. This policy continues to have a signi¯cant positive, but smaller, e®ect on employment in
subsequent years. This increase in full-time employment is balanced by reductions in non-employment
and, to a small extent, part-time work. The reduction in part-time work implies that temporarily
incentivizing non-employed individuals to work full-time has a small crowding out e®ect on part-time
work. For example, one year after the policy intervention, labor force participation is 28.5 percentage
points higher than in the absence of the policy intervention, as the policy leads to a 2 percentage point
reduction in part-time work.
Similarly, Figure 2(b) shows the average long-run e®ect on employment behavior of a temporary
policy causing non-employed individuals to move into part-time work. This policy causes a signi¯cant
increase in part-time work, and a slight increase in full-time work, together balanced by a reduction
in non-employment. The one year own-state dependence e®ect for part-time employment is 26.5
percentage points, which is smaller than the corresponding own-state dependence e®ect for full-time
employment. However, as the policy incentivizing part-time employment causes a slight increase in
full-time employment while incentivizing full-time employment causes a reduction in subsequent part-
time employment, the e®ects of the two policies on the rate non-employment are very similar. For
example, one year after the policy intervention incentivizing part-time employment, non-employment
is 28 percentage points lower, as compared to 28.5 percentage points if instead the policy targeting full-
time employment was implemented. The asymmetric cross-state e®ects of the two policies highlight
the additional insight gained from analyzing labor supply using a multinomial, rather than binary,
framework; modeling only the decision as to work full-time would overstate the gain in terms of
reduced non-employment obtainable from a policy incentivizing full-time work, and we learn that
although part-time employment can provide a stepping-stone into full-time work, the magnitude of
this e®ect is small.
The remaining panels in Figure 2 show how employment dynamics following job creation schemes
vary between demographic groups.17 Figures 2(c) and 2(d) reveal that the state dependence e®ects for
highly educated individuals, de¯ned as those having a university degree, are similar to the e®ects for
the sample average. Figures 2(e) and 2(f) meanwhile show the dynamic responses to the two policy
interventions among women who have a child one year after the policy intervention. We see that the
policy incentivizing full-time employment causes a far smaller increase in full-time employment among
women with children than for the sample average and, in contrast to the results for the sample average,
part-time employment increases for this group of women. In fact, subsequent to one year after the
policy intervention, part-time employment increases by almost as much as full-time employment. Thus,
for women with children, full-time employment provides a stepping stone into part-time employment.
For women who experience a birth in the year after the policy intervention, the policy incentivizing
part-time employment increases signi¯cantly part-time employment and has a positive, but tiny, e®ect
on full-time work. Importantly, for this group of women, incentivizing part-time employment is more
e®ective at reducing non-employment than incentivizing full-time employment; the reduction in non-
employment between 1 and 7 years after the policy intervention is between 1 and 2 percentage points
higher if the policy incentivized part-time rather than full-time employment. This results implies
17The illustrated employment e®ects in Figures 2(c)-2(f) are obtained by averaging over the sample distribution of all
other individual characteristics.
22that maximizing the long-term e®ectiveness of policies incentivizing employment requires tailoring of
polices according to demographic characteristics. Again, it should be noted that a binary model of
labor force participation is uninformative about the relative merits for di®erent demographic groups
of labor market policies facilitating full-time or part-time employment.
5.3 Heterogeneity in Labor Supply Dynamics after Child Birth
We use the parameter estimates for Speci¯cation VI to explore the extent of heterogeneity in labor
supply dynamics following the birth of a child. Table 4 shows that there is signi¯cant variation in
the e®ects of having a child aged under one year on a woman's payo®s from full-time and, to a lesser
but still signi¯cant extent, part-time work, relative to non-employment. Together with the signi¯cant
state dependence e®ects documented above, heterogeneity in the e®ects of a young child suggests that
there may be persistent di®erences in labor supply behavior following the birth of a child.
Figure 3 shows the estimated e®ect a having a child on subsequent employment behavior for
women at di®erent points in the distribution of unobserved preferences for full-time and part-time
work in the event that they have a young child. Figure 3(a) shows the for women who have a high
unobserved preference for full-time work, having a young child has very little immediate e®ect on labor
supply behavior. As the child becomes older these women become more likely to work part-time and
less likely to work full-time, as compared to if they had not had a child. Non-employment increases
slightly 3-6 years following the birth of the child. Thus, we conclude, that for women with a very strong
preference for full-time work in the event that they have a child, there is a substitution away from
full-time work, but no pronounced movement away from employment more generally. We see from
Figure 3(b) that the picture is dramatically di®erent for women who have a relatively low preference
for full-time work if they have a young child. For such women, the birth of a child is accompanied by
a large substitution away from both full-time and part-time work and into non-employment. After 2
years, part-time employment is higher than if the women had not had a child, however it takes many
years before the labor supply behavior of women with a low preference for full-time work is similar
to that of women with a high preference for full-time work. Indeed, 8 years after having a child the
proportion of high preference women working full-time is still 6 percentage points higher than that of
low preference women.
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) illustrate the change in labor supply behavior over time caused by the birth of
a child for women with high and low preferences for part-time work in the event they have a child aged
under one year. These ¯gures attract two comments. First we see very little di®erence in labor supply
behavior between women with high and with low unobserved preferences for part-time work when
they have a young child. Thus, although we ¯nd signi¯cant heterogeneity in payo®s from part-time
work among women who have a child aged under one year, this does not translate into appreciable
di®erences in labor supply behavior following the birth of a child. Second, the con¯dence intervals
at t = 0 are very large, which re°ects the large amounts of unobserved variation in preferences for
full-time employment among women who have a young child.
5.4 Comparisons with More Restrictive Speci¯cations
Comparisons are now made with speci¯cations that impose more restrictive distributions of unobserv-
ables than Speci¯cation VI. Recall that the primary motivation for allowing a generality, in the form
of autocorrelation and random coe±cients, in the distribution of unobservables was that imposing an
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(d) E®ect of having a child at t = 1 - Low unobserved
preference for part-time work.
Notes: Vertical bars represent 95% con¯dence intervals. High and low unobservables refer to the 90
th and 10
th percentiles
of the distribution of unobservables. Other unobservables are drawn from the appropriate conditional distribution. Ef-
fects were estimated by averaging over the sample distribution of all observed individual characteristics, except children.
Figure 3: Heterogeneity in labor supply dynamics after child birth.
state dependence e®ects and the associated policy responses. Therefore, when comparing the various
speci¯cations, attention focused on di®erences in estimates of intertemporal dependencies. However,
for completeness, at the end of this subsection we discuss brie°y model selection criteria and average
marginal e®ects.
Figures 4 and 5 show the e®ect of temporary job creation policies on subsequent employment
behavior as implied by each of the six model speci¯cations under consideration. As in Section 5.2
above, the policies under consideration cause women who chose non-employment in both their ¯rst
and second years in the sample to move into, depending on the policy, either full-time or part-time
work in their second year in the sample. We present state dependence e®ects averaged over the sample
and for women who gave birth to a child one year after the policy intervention. Table 6 details the
signi¯cance of the di®erence between the predications based on Speci¯cation VI and those based on
more restrictive speci¯cations.
Figure 4 shows that on average Speci¯cation I implies, for both full-time and part-time work, sub-
stantially larger own-state and cross-state dependencies than Speci¯cation VI; as expected completely
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Figure 4: Comparison of the dynamic e®ects of policy interventions based on Speci¯cations I-VI.
behavior. Looking across all of the own-state and cross-state dependence e®ects, there is very little
di®erence between the results implied by Speci¯cations II and III. In other words, despite of ¯nding
signi¯cant evidence for non-normally distributed random intercepts, generalizing the distribution of
the time invariant random intercepts to be non-normal does not impact of estimates of intertemporal
dependencies.
Focusing ¯rst on the e®ects of the policy incentivizing full-time employment and considering the
sample average, we see that the own-state dependencies impled by Speci¯cation VI are larger than
those implied by Speci¯cations II-V. Speci¯cally, according to Speci¯cation VI the one year own-state
dependence e®ect for full-time employment is 30.5 percentage points, while Speci¯cations IV and
V, which exclude random coe±cients and autocorrelation respectively, suggest a one year own-state
dependence e®ect of around 25 percentage points. Speci¯cations II and III, which allow only random
intercepts, meanwhile suggest even lower own-state dependence e®ects. Furthermore, di®erences in
the estimated own-state dependence e®ect for full-time employment are evident for several years.
Table 6 shows that many of these di®erences are signi¯cant. Thus we conclude that permitting
both random coe±cients and autocorrelated unobservables is necessary to estimate accurately the
degree of own-state dependence in full-time employment. There are also signi¯cant di®erences in
the estimated cross-state e®ects of the policy incentivizing full-time employment on subsequent part-
time employment. Speci¯cally, Speci¯cation VI suggests a larger negative, or crowding out, e®ect on
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Figure 5: Comparison of the dynamic e®ects of policy interventions based on Speci¯cations I-VI.
implied by Speci¯cations II and VI, as well as the three intermediate speci¯cations, are very similar.
The cross-state dependencies also show little variation. In summary, the modeling of unobserved
heterogeneity has greater implications for estimation of own-state and cross-state dependencies for
full-time employment than for part-time employment.
Figure 5 shows the own-state and cross-state dependence e®ect induced by the two policies for
women who gave birth to a child one year after the policy intervention.18 Figure 5(a) reveals that one
year after the policy incentivizing non-employed women to move into full-time employment the esti-
mate rate of full-time employment is signi¯cantly higher according to Speci¯cation VI than according
to any of the other speci¯cation. Speci¯cally, according to Speci¯cation VI, this policy increases the
rate of full-time employment one year after the policy by 8 percentage points, while Speci¯cation V,
which excludes autocorrelation in the random intercepts, implies an e®ect of 6 percentage points. The
remaining speci¯cations suggest one year own-state dependence e®ects for full-time employment of be-
tween 2 and 4 percentage points. For the subgroup of women with children it appears therefore that
random coe±cients are more important than autocorrelation in the random intercepts, which is in con-
trast to the results for the sample average where speci¯cations IV and V performed similarly. Table 6
shows that signi¯cant di®erences between the estimated own-state dependence e®ects for full-time
18As in Section 5.2, the illustrated employment e®ects in Figures 2(c)-2(f) are obtained by averaging over the sample
distribution of all other individual characteristics.
26Policy E®ect
Years since Policy Intervention
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Own-state E®ects
Di®erence between Spec. II and Spec. VI
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) 3.93 3.36 3.12 3.44 3.27 2.79 3.43 2.64 2.37 2.24 2.06
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) -0.18 0.00 -0.21 0.11 0.50 0.29 0.95 0.66 1.31 0.62 0.24
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) 5.58 3.10 3.31 2.56 2.66 2.38 2.35 1.52 1.47 1.71 0.49
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) 0.46 0.96 0.28 0.98 0.98 1.23 1.39 1.49 1.59 1.51 1.21
Di®erence between Spec. IV and Spec. VI
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) 1.87 2.49 2.41 2.58 2.51 2.07 2.91 2.03 2.46 1.63 1.35
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) 0.47 0.79 0.95 0.94 1.02 1.05 1.17 1.31 1.52 1.05 0.69
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) 4.90 2.51 2.45 1.90 2.09 1.45 1.58 0.72 1.16 1.32 0.49
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) 1.93 1.95 1.31 1.59 1.55 1.61 1.55 1.43 1.59 1.42 1.21
Di®erence between Spec. V and Spec. VI
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) 2.39 1.84 1.89 1.56 1.42 1.20 1.39 0.49 0.41 0.28 -0.08
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) -0.46 -0.37 -0.41 -0.41 -0.19 -0.25 -0.10 -0.81 -0.37 -1.49 -0.91
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) 2.20 0.74 1.67 1.12 1.09 0.87 0.98 0.26 0.12 -0.27 -0.33
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) -0.50 0.03 0.02 -0.37 0.13 -0.11 0.46 -0.26 0.00 -0.21 -0.53
Cross-state E®ects
Di®erence between Spec. II and Spec. VI
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) -1.95 -2.06 -1.78 -2.44 -2.11 -1.98 -1.63 -1.69 -1.69 -2.07 -1.54
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) 0.47 0.35 0.71 1.29 1.72 1.02 2.17 1.24 1.03 2.19 2.81
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) -0.85 -0.34 -0.44 -0.40 -0.70 -0.97 -1.05 -0.67 -0.48 -0.60 0.16
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) 0.48 0.76 1.10 0.37 0.53 0.41 0.78 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.00
Di®erence between Spec. IV and Spec. VI
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) 0.00 -0.91 -0.84 -1.47 -1.65 -1.45 -1.43 -1.04 -1.83 -1.51 -0.88
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) -0.17 0.10 0.22 0.93 0.83 0.15 1.23 0.36 0.43 1.00 1.41
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) -0.02 -0.14 0.49 -0.11 -0.62 -0.65 -0.98 -0.41 -0.48 -0.60 0.34
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) 0.78 0.79 1.24 0.63 0.35 0.59 0.78 0.65 0.29 0.35 0.44
Di®erence between Spec. V and Spec. VI
¢ Part-time emp. (Sample average) -1.82 -1.60 -1.59 -1.92 -1.88 -2.18 -1.34 -1.15 -1.13 -1.79 -0.11
¢ Full-time emp. (Sample average) -0.01 -0.24 -0.13 0.27 0.26 -0.54 0.40 0.12 -0.47 0.84 0.93
¢ Part-time emp. (Young child) -0.85 -0.61 -1.08 -1.66 -1.32 -1.82 -1.45 -1.43 -1.07 -1.07 0.00
¢ Full-time emp. (Young child) -0.35 -0.21 -0.33 0.11 -1.06 0.00 -0.61 0.85 -0.53 -0.59 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped. ¢ denotes the change relative to the baseline case, where no policy intervention
took place. Young child refers to women who had a young child one year after the policy intervention. Speci¯cation I is
omitted because predictions are always signi¯cantly di®erent to those from Speci¯cation VI. Speci¯cation III is omitted
because results are almost identical to those from Speci¯cation II.
Table 6: t tests for signi¯cance of di®erences in the own and cross-state e®ects of policies incentivizing
full-time and part-time employment.
employment based on the di®erent speci¯cations persist for up to 7 years. Panels (c)- (d) in Figure 5
show little variation across speci¯cations II-VI in the predicted employment behavior following the
policy incentivizing part-time work. Additionally, cross-state e®ects of previous full-time employment
on current part-time employment, shown in Figure 5(b) are also similar across speci¯cations II-VI.
Table 5 shows that estimates of average marginal e®ects of changes in individual characteristics
are rather robust to the assumed distribution of the unobservables. Thus the sensitivity of our results
to the assumed distribution of unobservables does not extend to estimates of the average e®ect of
observed individual characteristics on labor supply behavior. Finally, we note that model selection
criteria, presented in Table 3, are inconclusive regarding the preferred speci¯cation of unobservables:
the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973) suggests that Speci¯cation VI is preferred, while
the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwartz, 1978), which imposes a greater penalty for model
27complexity, selects Speci¯cation II.
5.5 Robustness to Random E®ects Assumption
The robustness of the results to the random e®ects assumption common to all of these models is
investigated by estimating dynamic linear probability models in which persistent unobserved individual
characteristics take the form of ¯xed e®ects rather than random e®ects. The linearity of these models
means that results will not necessarily be consistent with an interpretation as choice probabilities, in
particular predicted probabilities may lie outside the unit interval and estimated marginal e®ects may
be greater than one in absolute terms. However, the linearity of the resulting equations allows the
inclusion of individual speci¯c ¯xed e®ects and therefore persistent unobservables have an arbitrary
distribution and an unrestricted relationship with the explanatory variables. A comparison of the
estimation results from these models with the results obtained from a dynamic mixed multinomial logit
model in which persistent unobservables take the form of time invariant individual speci¯c random
e®ects, i.e., Speci¯cations II and III, therefore provides a robustness check of the random e®ects
assumption used in the dynamic mixed multinomial logit models.
The dynamic linear probability models considered herein are described by the following two equa-
tions
Yi;f;t = ­i;t¡1¸f + Xi;t¯f + µi;f + "i;f;t for t = 3;:::;T; (10a)
Yi;p;t = ­i;t¡1¸p + Xi;t¯p + µi;p + "i;p;t for t = 3;:::;T: (10b)
In the above ¯j and ¸j for j = f;p are suitably dimensioned vectors of unknown parameters. The
speci¯cation of the individual's employment history, ­i;t¡1, is as described above in Section 3. Total
unobservables have been decomposed into time invariant components, µi;f and µi;p, and time-varying
components "i;f;t and "i;p;t. If µi;f and µi;p are allowed to be ¯xed e®ects, consistent estimates of
[¯f;¸f] and [¯p;¸p] can be obtained by using appropriate lagged levels of the woman's employment
history and time-varying individual characteristics as instruments for ¯rst di®erence versions of the
above equations (see Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Hotz et al., 1988).
Table 7 reports the relevant results from the dynamic linear probability models of full-time and
part-time work obtained from Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of the ¯rst di®er-
ence version of Equations (10a) and (10b). While the dynamic mixed multinomial logit models and
the dynamic linear probability models draw on di®erent distributional assumptions, GMM estimation
of the ¯rst di®erence linear probability models for full-time and part-time work implies own-state
dependencies that are broadly comparable to the average marginal e®ects of previous employment
outcomes based on the results from Speci¯cations II and III of the dynamic mixed multinomial logit
model, reported in Table 5. For example, Speci¯cation II of the dynamic mixed multinomial logit
model implies that working full-time or part-time rather than being non-employed in the previous
year increases a woman's probability of being in the same employment state in the current year by
31.37(1.74) and 27.77(2.27) percentage points respectively. The corresponding ¯gures based on the
dynamic linear probability models are 35.97(2.89) and 33.91(2.47) percentage points.
The one year cross-state e®ects implied by the dynamic mixed multinomial logit model and the
dynamic linear probability models also are comparable. According to the dynamic linear probability
models, working part-time rather then being non-employed decreases a woman's probability of work-
ing full-time in the current year by 3:83(1:64) percentage points, while previous full-time employment
reduces the probability of current part-time employment by 7.21(2.81) percentage points. The cor-
28responding ¯gures based in Speci¯cation II of the dynamic mixed multinomial logit model, reported
in Table 5, are 2.37(1.95) and 9.45(1.71) percentage points. These similarities in the own-state and
cross-state dependencies suggest that the random e®ects assumption imposed when estimating the
dynamic mixed multinomial logit models is not overly restrictive.





































# Parameters 26 26
# Instruments 250 250
# Observations -
PN
i=1 T 17299 17299
Notes: Coe±cient estimates have been multiplied by 100. Standard errors in parenthesis. Both equations
further include the household structure variables, fertility expectations, non-labor income, year dummies
and age terms. Instruments consist of employment outcomes, income and child variables in the years t ¡ 2,
t ¡ 3 and t ¡ 4, and current dated values of age and the time dummies. While deeper lags of employment
outcomes, income and child variables should also provide valid instruments, further moment conditions are
not exploited as the Sargan statistics obtained when utilizing a large number of over-identifying restrictions
have been shown to under reject when testing the validity of the instrument set or other relevant hypotheses
(see Bowsher, 2002).
Table 7: GMM estimation of dynamic linear probability models of full-time and part-time work.
The results from GMM estimation of the dynamic linear probability models further reveal signi¯-
cant own state e®ects over a two year time horizon. However, for both full-time and part-time work,
F tests for the joint signi¯cance of employment outcomes dated three years previously do not reject the
null hypothesis that these additional variables are insigni¯cant. Thus we conclude that, as imposed in
the dynamic mixed multinomial logit models, there are state dependencies in women's labor supply
behavior spanning two years, but not longer.
6 Conclusion
This paper has extended the literature on binary models of labor force participation dynamics by in-
cluding a distinction between full-time and part-time work and by allowing more general distribution
of unobserved individual characteristics. Within this setting, we have found signi¯cant autocorrelation
and signi¯cant variation in the e®ects of education and children on labor supply behavior. We have
shown that excluding either of these two features of the distribution of unobservables impacts signi¯-
cantly on estimates of the long-term e®ects of temporary policy interventions. In particular, working
with a speci¯cation of the unobservables allowing time invariant individual speci¯c random e®ects, but
no further generality in the distribution of unobservables, results in signi¯cant downward biases in the
estimated e®ect of a woman's previous employment behavior on her current choice between full-time
work, part-time work and non-employment. More general speci¯cations, allowing either autocorrela-
29tion in the employment state speci¯c intercepts or variation in the e®ects of children and education
on labor supply preferences, perform better. However, there remains a downward bias relative to
when both autocorrelation and random coe±cient are permitted. The biases caused by imposing
overly restrictive distributions of unobservables are large enough to make the choice of distribution of
unobservables important when conducting policy evaluation.
Leveraging the multinomial nature of our model, we have investigated the relative e®ectiveness
of policies facilitating full-time and part-time work. On average, over our sample of married or
cohabiting women, we have shown that part-time employment and full-time employment are equally
e®ective routes via which non-employed women can remain in work for a number of years. This result
is notable in the context of growing evidence for the United Kingdom showing that women in part-
time jobs tend to be poorly paid and are more likely to be working in manual occupations than their
full-time counterparts. Moreover, we have shown that for women with young children incentivizing
part-time work is more e®ective in obtaining a lasting reduction in non-employment than incentivizing
full-time work.
Appendix I: Monte Carlo Simulations I
Monte Carlo simulations are used to illustrate the poor numerical properties of the Maximum Like-
lihood estimator of the parameters of a dynamic mixed multinomial logit model in which there are
unobserved individual characteristics that a®ect payo®s in only one year and have distributions con-
taining unknown parameters. Further simulations show that reliable parameter estimates are obtained
if additional structure is imposed on the unobservables.
To maintain consistency, attention is restricted to the three state model of employment dynamics
described above, however similar results are obtained for static models and models with more than
three alternatives. The following speci¯cation of payo®s is adopted for t = 3;:::;T
V f(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;f;t) ¡ V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) = °f;f¡1Yi;f;t¡1 + °f;p¡1Yi;p;t¡1 + °f;f¡2Yi;f;t¡2
+°f;p¡2Yi;p;t¡2 + ¯f;0 + ¯f;1X1i;t + ¯f;2X2i;t + ´i;f;t + »i;f;t; (11a)
V p(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;p;t) ¡ V n(­i;t¡1;Xi;t;%i;n;t) = °p;f¡1Yi;f;t¡1 + °p;p¡1Yi;p;t¡1 + °p;f¡2Yi;f;t¡2
+°p;p¡2Yi;p;t¡2 + ¯p;0 + ¯p;1X1i;t + ¯p;2X2i;t + ´i;p;t + »i;p;t: (11b)
In the above Yi;j;t for j = f;p are indicators of employment outcomes and X1i;t and X2i;t are individual
speci¯c variables, constructed to be mutually independent, independent over time and individuals and
to have standard normal distributions. Individuals' employment outcomes at t = 1 and t = 2 are
determined randomly and are constructed to be independent of subsequent employment outcomes
thus allowing the initial conditions to be ignored. The unobservables »i;f;t and »i;p;t are assumed to
be mutually independent, independent over time and individuals and to have type I extreme value
distributions. The ¯rst component of the unobservables (´i;f;t;´i;p;t) is assumed to be formed as follows
´i;f;t = ºi;f +
PT
t=3 ¼i;f;tIt for t = 3;:::;T; (12a)
´i;p;t = ºi;p +
PT
t=3 ¼i;p;tIt for t = 3;:::;T; (12b)
where (ºi;f;ºi;p)0 » N(0;§), It for t = 3;:::;T are time dummies and (¼i;f;t;¼i;p;t) for t = 3;:::;T are
random coe±cients that are independent over time and individuals with (¼i;f;t;¼i;p;t)0 » N(0;¥t) for
t = 3;:::;T. This speci¯cation of the unobservables allows the employment state speci¯c intercepts
to include time invariant individual e®ects and additionally, via the random coe±cients on the time
30dummies, allows the time-varying components of the unobservables to be correlated or hetroscedastic.
When estimating this model, normalizations are imposed on ¥t
1;1 for t = 3;:::;T. Without such
normalizations, scale identi¯cation relies on the slight di®erence in the shapes of the logistic and
normal distributions (see Ben-Akiva et al., 2001). However, as explained in Section 3.3, even following
these normalizations identi¯cation remains reliant on the functional form of the distribution of the
unobservables. Excluding the random coe±cients on the time dummies leads to a model which is
nonparametrically identi¯ed provided T ¸ 4.
Parameter Truth
Random Coef. on Time Dummies Excluded Random Coef. on Time Dummies Permitted
E(parameter) E(¾) ¾(parameter) E(parameter) E(¾) ¾(parameter)
°f;f¡2 1 0.99 0.14 0.14 0.96 0.17 0.15
°f;p¡2 0.5 0.48 0.14 0.13 0.49 0.22 0.25
°f;f¡1 2 2.02 0.15 0.15 2.12 0.20 0.22
°f;p¡1 1 1.00 0.14 0.14 1.11 0.32 0.45
¯f;0 -1 -1.00 0.17 0.18 -1.03 0.51 0.68
¯f;1 -0.8 -0.80 0.09 0.09 -0.78 0.23 0.31
¯f;2 0.5 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.48 0.14 0.18
°p;f¡2 0.5 0.51 0.12 0.11 0.34 0.63 0.56
°p;p¡2 1 0.99 0.13 0.11 1.71 2.19 1.76
°p;f¡1 1 1.02 0.14 0.12 0.91 0.68 0.51
°p;p¡1 2 2.01 0.12 0.13 3.60 4.63 3.82
¯p;0 0.5 0.50 0.13 0.13 0.41 0.49 0.43
¯p;1 1 1.01 0.08 0.08 2.59 4.63 3.85
¯p;2 -0.5 -0.51 0.06 0.06 -1.39 2.58 2.18
§1;1 1 1.01 0.40 0.39 0.97 0.57 0.56
§2;1 0.5 0.51 0.27 0.27 0.49 1.15 0.82
§2;2 1 1.06 0.33 0.33 11.81 63.40 40.72
¥
3
1;1 4 [Fixed] - - - 4 - -
¥
3
2;1 1 - - - -0.83 7.46 7.70
¥
3
2;2 2 - - - 59.19 314.23 171.98
¥
4
1;1 4 [Fixed] - - - 4 - -
¥
4
2;1 1 - - - -0.40 6.46 6.10
¥
4
2;2 2 - - - 57.53 313.81 178.98
Average Iterations 4.18 38.41
Maximum Iterations 10 200
Notes: E(parameter) is the mean parameter estimate, E(¾) is the mean estimated standard error and ¾(parameter) is the
standard deviation of the parameter estimates over the 200 Monte Carlo replications. Maximum Simulated Likelihood
estimation used 5000 antithetic draws. The number of iterations is limited to 200.
Table 8: Monte Carlo simulations illustrating the properties of the Maximum Likelihood estimator of
the parameters of a dynamic mixed multinomial logit model with and without random coe±cients on
time dummies.
Monte Carlo simulations are conducted, ¯rst excluding random coe±cients on the time dummies
and then allowing random coe±cient on the time dummies. For each of these two Monte Carlo
experiments, the sample size is ¯xed at 3000 individuals and T = 4. For each of the speci¯cations,
200 data sets were generated and Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimates obtained for each data
set. The results are summarized in Table 8. In the simulations in which random coe±cients on
time dummies are excluded, average parameter estimates correspond closely to their true values and
average standard errors are almost identical to the standard deviation of the parameter estimates.
Convergence was obtained for all of the 200 Monte Carlo replications, and took an average of 4.18
iterations starting from the true parameter values. In contrast, the Monte Carlo results for the
31speci¯cation in which random coe±cients on the time dummies are permitted reveal major problems.
In many cases, the average coe±cients on the explanatory variables di®er substantially from their true
values, and average standard errors bear little resemblance to the standard deviation of the parameter
estimates. The estimates of the parameters of the covariance matrices reveal even greater problems:
in many cases average variances are several times greater than their true values and average standard
errors are huge. Furthermore, in around 10% of the Monte Carlo replications, convergence was not
obtained within the ¯rst 200 iterations.
Appendix II: Monte Carlo Simulations II
Two further Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in order to establish the empirical properties
of the Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimator in the context of dynamic mixed multinomial logit
models in which the deterministic components of payo®s are as described by Equations (11a) and (11b)
and the unobservables as in Speci¯cations V and VI, detailed above in Section 3.4. For each of the
speci¯cations of unobservables, 200 data sets were generated each with the same sample size, attrition
pattern and distribution of the initial conditions as observed in the BHPS sample. In order to explore
the how the simulation bias varies with R, the number of antithetic draws to evaluate the likelihood
function, all simulations are conduced using R =500, 2000 and 5000.
Tables 9-10 summarize the estimates of the deterministic components of coe±cients. For Speci-
¯cation V, which permits random coe±cients but excludes autocorrelated unobservables, there is a
close correspondence between the average estimates of the deterministic components of coe±cients and
the true values and the average standard errors are close to the standard deviation of the parameter
estimates. This is true for R = 500 as well as for higher values of R. However, when R = 500 there
is evidence of biases in some of the parameters appearing in the distribution of the unobservables.
In particular, some of the estimates of the variances of the random coe±cients appear to be biased
downwards. These biases are substantially reduced when R is increased to 2000 and all but eliminated
by using R = 5000. The result for Speci¯cation VI, which features autocorrelated unobservables in
addition to random coe±cients, show that there are small biases, up to 6% of the true parameter
value, in the deterministic components of coe±cients appearing in the payo®s when R = 5000 is used.
Similarly, with R = 5000, there are downwards biases in many of the variance parameters appearing
in the distribution of the unobservables. For both sets of parameters, lower values of R are associated
with substantially greater biases.
Tables 13 and 14 show, for Speci¯cations V and VI respectively, the average dynamic responses to
policy interventions evaluated at the estimated parameter values and at the true parameter values. For
Speci¯cation V, which excludes autocorrelated unobservables, the average estimated policy responses
obtained using 500 antithetic draws are never more than 0.4 of a percentage point away from the true
policy responses. Therefore moderately large biases in the parameter estimates translate into very
small biases in the estimated policy responses. Increasing the number of antithetic draws to 2000
tends to reduce the di®erence between the estimated and true policy responses, while an increase to
5000 leads to a further, albeit small, decreased in the di®erence between the estimated and true policy
responses.
The Monte Carlo simulations for Speci¯cation VI, which includes autocorrelated unobservables,
show that relying on only 500 antithetic draws when evaluating the likelihood functions leads to average
estimated policy responses that diverge by up to 2.2 percentage points from the true policy responses.
For example, a policy that temporarily moves non-employed individuals into full-time work decreases
32the rate of non-employment by 11.65 percentage points one year after the policy while the estimated
e®ect is 13.84 percentage points. Increasing the number of antithetic draws to 2000 approximately
halves the magnitude of the di®erence between the estimated and simulated policy responses and
an increase to 5000 antithetic draws leads to a further reduction in the bias in the estimated policy
responses. However, even using 5000 antithetic draws, which would generally be considered a large
number of draws, there are some biases in the estimated policy responses. However, using R = 5000,
the maximum bias in the estimated policy responses is only 0.6 of a percentage point, and in relative
terms the biases are around 3-6% of the corresponding true quantity.
VARIABLE
TRUTH R = 500 R = 2000 R = 5000
f p f p f p f p




















































































Notes: Average standard errors are given in round brackets and the standard deviation of the
parameter estimates is given in square brackets. Estimates of the parameters on the initial
conditions are omitted. Columns headed f contain the coe±cient describing payo®s from full-
time employment and columns headed p contain the coe±cients describing payo®s from part-time
employment. Results are based on 200 Monte Carlo replications.
Table 9: Results of Monte Carlo simulations for Speci¯cation V: Average estimates of the deterministic
components of coe±cients.
VARIABLE
TRUTH R = 500 R = 2000 R = 5000
f p f p f p f p




















































































Notes: See Table 9.
Table 10: Results of Monte Carlo simulations for Speci¯cation VI: Average estimates of the determin-
istic components of coe±cients.

























































































































































































































































































Notes: Average standard errors are given in round brackets and the standard deviation of the parameter
estimates is given in square brackets. Results are based on 200 Monte Carlo replications.
Table 11: Results of Monte Carlo simulations for Speci¯cation V: Average estimates of parameters in
the distribution of unobservables.























































































































































































































































































































Notes: See Table 11.
Table 12: Results of Monte Carlo simulations for Speci¯cation VI: Average estimates of parameters
in the distribution of unobservables.
34EMPLOYMENT YEARS SINCE POLICY INTERVENTION
STATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
True dynamic responses
Non-employed moved into full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 14.93 10.87 3.94 3.36 1.77 1.42 0.88 0.71 0.49 0.41 0.32
Part-time -3.41 -4.60 -2.17 -2.32 -1.34 -1.14 -0.73 -0.61 -0.42 -0.36 -0.27
Non-employment -11.51 -6.27 -1.77 -1.04 -0.43 -0.28 -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Non-employed moved into part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.56 -3.41 -1.47 -1.66 -0.90 -0.77 -0.45 -0.39 -0.29 -0.23 -0.18
Part-time 16.43 10.84 3.67 3.12 1.53 1.17 0.68 0.54 0.38 0.31 0.23
Non-employment -12.87 -7.43 -2.20 -1.46 -0.63 -0.41 -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 500
Non-employed moved into full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 15.31 11.08 4.05 3.29 1.74 1.35 0.84 0.66 0.47 0.38 0.29
Part-time -3.49 -4.56 -2.11 -2.24 -1.27 -1.10 -0.70 -0.58 -0.41 -0.35 -0.27
Non-employment -11.82 -6.52 -1.94 -1.05 -0.46 -0.25 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02
Non-employed moved into part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.28 -3.25 -1.36 -1.56 -0.83 -0.72 -0.43 -0.37 -0.27 -0.22 -0.16
Part-time 16.46 10.88 3.72 3.02 1.49 1.14 0.67 0.53 0.36 0.30 0.20
Non-employment -13.18 -7.63 -2.36 -1.46 -0.66 -0.42 -0.23 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 2000
Non-employed moved into full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 14.98 10.90 3.97 3.36 1.77 1.41 0.87 0.70 0.48 0.40 0.29
Part-time -3.37 -4.59 -2.14 -2.34 -1.33 -1.14 -0.73 -0.62 -0.43 -0.37 -0.27
Non-employment -11.61 -6.31 -1.83 -1.01 -0.45 -0.27 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
Non-employed moved into part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.47 -3.31 -1.41 -1.59 -0.85 -0.72 -0.44 -0.37 -0.28 -0.23 -0.17
Part-time 16.47 10.80 3.68 3.03 1.49 1.14 0.66 0.53 0.36 0.30 0.21
Non-employment -13.00 -7.49 -2.26 -1.44 -0.63 -0.42 -0.22 -0.15 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 5000
Non-employed moved into full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 14.98 10.89 3.94 3.34 1.78 1.42 0.88 0.71 0.49 0.42 0.32
Part-time -3.41 -4.61 -2.13 -2.30 -1.33 -1.13 -0.73 -0.61 -0.43 -0.37 -0.28
Non-employment -11.57 -6.28 -1.81 -1.03 -0.45 -0.28 -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
Non-employed moved into part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.52 -3.32 -1.42 -1.61 -0.86 -0.75 -0.44 -0.39 -0.29 -0.23 -0.18
Part-time 16.41 10.78 3.66 3.07 1.50 1.16 0.68 0.54 0.38 0.31 0.24
Non-employment -12.90 -7.46 -2.24 -1.46 -0.64 -0.41 -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05
Notes: Based on 200 Monte Carlo replications. All ¯gures are percentage point changes for
women a®ected by the policy.
Table 13: Average policy responses for Speci¯cation V using R=500, 2000 and 5000.
35EMPLOYMENT YEARS SINCE POLICY INTERVENTION
STATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
True dynamic responses
Non-employed moved to full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 14.40 10.25 3.45 2.96 1.48 1.23 0.71 0.55 0.38 0.31 0.25
Part-time -2.75 -3.59 -1.55 -1.79 -1.03 -0.96 -0.64 -0.48 -0.36 -0.28 -0.21
Non-employment -11.65 -6.66 -1.92 -1.18 -0.45 -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
Non-employed moved to part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.10 -2.07 -1.35 -1.40 -0.75 -0.62 -0.41 -0.33 -0.23 -0.16 -0.12
Part-time 16.00 10.98 3.76 3.09 1.47 1.04 0.63 0.45 0.28 0.23 0.18
Non-employment -12.90 -7.91 -2.41 -1.69 -0.72 -0.43 -0.21 -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 500
Non-employed moved to full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 16.16 11.34 4.21 3.16 1.65 1.23 0.77 0.59 0.40 0.30 0.23
Part-time -2.32 -3.34 -1.53 -1.71 -0.96 -0.84 -0.54 -0.45 -0.32 -0.24 -0.18
Non-employment -13.84 -8.00 -2.68 -1.44 -0.69 -0.39 -0.23 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
Non-employed moved to part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -2.88 -2.91 -1.22 -1.36 -0.72 -0.63 -0.37 -0.31 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13
Part-time 17.66 11.66 4.18 3.17 1.60 1.16 0.68 0.51 0.35 0.28 0.19
Non-employment -14.78 -8.75 -2.97 -1.81 -0.88 -0.53 -0.32 -0.20 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 2000
Non-employed moved to full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 15.16 10.57 3.84 3.06 1.60 1.21 0.73 0.57 0.37 0.32 0.23
Part-time -2.53 -3.36 -1.53 -1.77 -1.00 -0.87 -0.55 -0.47 -0.31 -0.27 -0.19
Non-employment -12.62 -7.21 -2.31 -1.29 -0.60 -0.35 -0.19 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04
Non-employed moved to part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.11 -2.92 -1.22 -1.40 -0.76 -0.64 -0.39 -0.32 -0.22 -0.18 -0.14
Part-time 16.88 11.26 3.96 3.13 1.55 1.14 0.67 0.49 0.34 0.26 0.19
Non-employment -13.77 -8.34 -2.73 -1.73 -0.79 -0.50 -0.28 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05
Estimated Dynamic responses R = 5000
Non-employed moved to full-time work at t = 2
Full-time 14.89 10.57 3.77 3.06 1.56 1.20 0.73 0.56 0.38 0.31 0.22
Part-time -2.65 -3.55 -1.57 -1.79 -0.99 -0.86 -0.55 -0.46 -0.31 -0.26 -0.19
Non-employment -12.24 -7.02 -2.20 -1.27 -0.57 -0.34 -0.18 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03
Non-employed moved to part-time work at t = 2
Full-time -3.08 -2.88 -1.23 -1.39 -0.74 -0.64 -0.39 -0.32 -0.23 -0.18 -0.14
Part-time 16.48 11.01 3.84 3.08 1.51 1.13 0.65 0.49 0.34 0.26 0.19
Non-employment -13.40 -8.14 -2.61 -1.69 -0.77 -0.49 -0.27 -0.17 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05
Notes: Based on 200 Monte Carlo replications. All ¯gures are percentage point changes for
women a®ected by the policy.
Table 14: Average policy responses for Speci¯cation VI using R=500, 2000 and 5000.
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